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STRANGER IN PARODIES: WEIRD AL AND
THE LAW OF MUSICAL SATIRE
Charles I. Sanders*
and Steven R. Gordon**
Musical parody, both as folk art and high satire, has existed as a
form of critical and humorous expression for centuries. Its popular-
ity is evidenced by the humorous indulgences of musical giants the
likes of Mozart, Gilbert and Sullivan, Spike Jones, and Allan Sher-
man. Not, however, until recording artist Weird Al Yankovic began
making records and music videos like "Living With A Hernia"(sung
to the tune of the hit "Living in America") and "I Lost On Jeopardy"
(sung to the melody of "Our Love's in Jeopardy"), did the American
music industry finally reawaken to the reality of just how lucrative
music parody can be.
In light of Mr. Yankovic's startling commercial success (well over
three million copies of his records have been sold), the issue arises
whether such highly marketable song parodies represent "fair uses"
of the lampooned underlying musical works, or whether the U.S.
Copyright Act' requires Weird Al and other aspiring musical paro-
dists to secure licenses from the copyright owners of such works
prior to plying their trade. This article will consider that question in
light of the recent Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Fisher
v. Dees,' and the most recent rulings of the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals, which have substantially clarified the fair use doctrine's
application to musical parodies.3
A WORKING DEFINITION
Parody has been defined as "writing in which the language and
style of [another] author or work is closely imitated for comic effect
or ridicule, often with certain peculiarities greatly heightened or ex-
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aggerated."' In order to be effective, therefore, a parody must
draw upon elements of the original work. It has been said that "the
parodist utterly fails in his task if his audience does not realize that
his work has as its source another author's work."s
Thus, there is an inherent tension between copyright law (which
seeks to protect original works of authorship from infringement) and
parody, the legal resolution of which historically rested on a judi-
cial determination of the relative artistic merit and literary value of
parody. This would seemingly have placed musical parodists in a
particularly unfavorable position, since even a judge sensitive to the
value of literary parody might view song parodies as frivolous and
deserving of little protection. Interestingly, such has not been the
case. To the contrary, musical copyright cases have formed the
bedrock of the judicially authored doctrine of parody as "fair use"
in the United States, and have served as the basis for that doctrine's
recent judicial expansion.6
Therefore, rather than turning directly to a specific application of
the laws governing parody today to the works of contemporary mu-
sical parodists like Weird Al Yankovic, it is important to review the
U.S. judicial history of musical parody and parody in general to
gain a greater perspective about the development of this important
body of entertainment law. Because an overwhelming majority of
reported parody cases have been decided by courts in the Second
and Ninth Circuits, and each of those two Circuits applied its own
distinct approach to the parody issue prior to the most recent cases,
this article will detail the chronology of decisions in the two Circuits
separately.
4. WEismER's T~m NEw INTMrNATioAL DiCONARY 1643 (1986).
5. Bernstein, Parody and Fair Use in Copyright Law, 31 COPYRIGHT L.
SYMP. II ASCAP (1984).
6. In determining whether given conduct constitutes copyright infringement,
the courts have long recognized that certain acts of copying are defensible as "fair
use." Section 107 of the Copyright Act (17 U.S.C.) lists the factors to be consid-
ered for the purpose of "determining whether the use made of work in any particu-
lar case is a fair use." 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988). It does not, and does not purport, to
provide a rule which may automatically be applied in deciding whether any partic-
ular use is "fair." 3 M. Numnz, Nnuam ON CopvmoHr § 13.05 [A] at 13-64 (rev. ed.
1990). These factors are: "(1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the
use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work." 17 U.S.C.
§ 107 (1988). "These four factors, for the most part, were culled from the prior
case law discussions of fair use," M. Nogmm, supra, at 13-65. Their codification in
the 1976 Act was intended merely to restate the then-existing judicial doctrine of
fair use. M. Nu&4.R, supra, at 13-62.43. "Therefore, in determining the scope and
limits of fair use, reference must be made to pre-, as well as post-1978 cases." M.
NuadER ON Cop-oHr, supra § 13.05, at 13-62.44.
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I. U.S. PARODY DECISIONS
The first American case in which the issue of parody arose was
Bloom and Hamlin v. Nixon.7 In that case, the defendant publicly
performed portions of the plaintiff's copyrighted song without li-
cense, as part of her impersonation of a popular actress currently
performing the same song in the stage version of The Wizard of Oz.
The court ruled in favor of the defendant under the "fair use" doc-
trine, noting that she acted in good faith by singing just the chorus of
the song as an incidental aspect to her mimicry of the actress, and
did not attempt to usurp the plaintiff's market for his copyrighted
song through such performances.' Thus was the precedent estab-
lished in the United States that parody is an art form deserving of
protection, under certain circumstances, from zealous copyright
owners seeking absolute control over the uses of their works.
A. The Second Circuit "New York" View
The Second Circuit view of parody has developed through a se-
ries of cases dating from the early part of this century, nearly all of
which have involved musical satire. Within six years following the
Nixon decision, district courts in the Second Circuit ruled on two
cases with fact patterns nearly identical to it.
In Green v. Minzenheimer9 (S.D.N.Y. 1909), the defendant pre-
vailed against a copyright owner portions of whose song the defend-
ant had sung incidental to his impersonation of a popular singer.
Consistently, it was ruled in Green v. Luby' ° (C.C.N.Y. 1909) that
the defendant's use of an entire copyrighted song as part of an im-
personation did constitute copyright infringement, since the taking
of the whole song was "hardly required" 1 for an effective
impersonation.
The next important parody decision in the Second Circuit did not
occur until 1963, with the Court of Appeals decision in Berlin v.
E.C. Publications Inc. (The Mad Magazine Case).12 That case in-
volved a suit by copyright owner Irving Berlin against Mad Maga-
zine, which had published a book of parody lyrics to popular,
copyrighted songs, many owned by the plaintiff. Mad Magazine did
not reproduce the music or lyrics to any of the underlying copy-
rights, but simply noted next to each of the parodies the legend "to
be sung to the tune of . . . " followed by the title of the particular
song involved in the lampoon. Examples of the Mad Magazine
7. 125 F. 977 (E.D. Pa. 1903).
8. Id. at 978.
9. 177 F. 286 (C.C. S.D.N.Y. 1909).
10. 177 F. 287 (C.C. S.D.N.Y. 1909).
11. Id.. at 288.
12. 329 F.2d 541 (1964).
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brand of humor included the parody "Louella Schwartz Describes
Her Malady," adapted to the tune of Berlin's "A Pretty Girl Is Like A
Melody."
In affirming the district court's ruling in favor of the defendant
Mad Magazine, Circuit Judge Irving Kaufman stated "we believe
that parody and satire are deserving of substantial freedom - both as
entertainment and as a form of social and literary criticism."'13 The
court then adopted the two-tiered parody test first set forth in
Nixon, 14 focusing on the economic harm to the plaintiff and the sub-
stantiality of the defendant's taking. Judge Kaufman wrote, "where,
as here, it is clear that the parody has neither the intent nor the ef-
fect of fulfilling the demand for the original, and where the parodist
does not appropriate a greater amount of the original work than is
necessary to 'recall or conjure up' the object of his satire, a finding
of infringement would be improper."' s
The Mad Magazine Case was followed by Walt Disney Produc-
tions v. Mature Pictures Corp. 16 (The Mouseketeer Case). In that
case, the defendants had used the "Mickey Mouse March," the
theme from the Mickey Mouse Club television program, as back-
ground music in their pornographic film. The particular scene in-
volved women performing sexual acts "on or near a pool table"
with three men wearing nothing but "Mouseketeer" hats, the back-
ground music under which consisted of continuous, repetitive use of
the entire Mouse March.
Relying mainly on the Mad Magazine Case, Judge Duffy ruled in
favor of the plaintiffs, stating that the defendants had taken far more
of the musical composition than was necessary to "recall or conjure
up" the object of the satire.'" Adding a new wrinkle to the Second
Circuit parody test, however, he added that "[w]hile defendants may
have been seeking in their display of bestiality to parody life, they
did not parody the Mickey Mouse March but sought only to improp-
erly use the copyrighted material."'" Thus, Judge Duffy ruled that a
parodist has less latitude in utilizing copyrighted music as a mere
13. Id. at 545.
14. See note 7 supra.
15. 329 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir. 1964). As a parting shot at Irving Berlin, whom
Judge Kaufman appeared to evaluate as a "spoiled sport," the Judge stated "the
fact that defendants' parodies were written in the same meter as the plaintiffs' com-
positions would seem inevitable if the original was to be recognized, but such a
justification is not even necessary; we doubt that even so eminent a composer as
plaintiff Irving Berlin should be permitted to claim a property interest in iambic
pentameter." Id.
16. 389 F. Supp. 1397 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
17. Id. at 1398 (citing Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 545 (2d
Cir. 1964)).
18. Id. at 1398.
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element of a larger parody than if the music itself was the object of
the satire.
The Elsmere and Wilson Cases
In 1980, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled on the semi-
nal case of E-emere Music, Inc. v. NBC, 9 which concerned a parody
of the New York State advertising theme "I Love New York" by the
cast of the television show "Saturday Night Live" as "I Love
Sodom." The district court held that even though the defendants'
substantial taking consisted of the very heart of the plaintiff's musi-
cal composition, it was still permissible as fair use since the bona-
fide social parody did not usurp the market of the original, or make
more extensive use of the song than was necessary to conjure it up.
Thus, the trial court recognized that song parodies, in particular,
often require a substantial taking from the original in order to simply
"conjure it up. "20
The Court of Appeals (Circuit Judges Feinberg, Newman and
Kearse) affirmed, taking the opportunity to further expand the fair
use doctrine regarding parody. Stating that "in today's world of
often unrelieved solemnity, copyright law should be hospitable to
the humor of parody," the court commented on the "substantiality"
issue as follows:
[The] [c]oncept of "conjuring up" an original came into the copy-
right law not as a limitation on how much of an original may be
used, but as a recognition that parody frequently needs to be more
than a fleeting evocation of an original in order to make its humor-
ous point .... [A] parody is entitled at least to "conjure up" the
original. Even more extensive use would still be fair use,
provid[ed] [the] parody builds upon the original, using [the] origi-
nal as [a] known element of modern culture and contributing
something new for humorous effect or commentary. 21
This ruling represented a high water mark in the Second Circuit's
liberalization of parody as a fair use defense to copyright infringe-
ment. To what extent, however, the principles set forth in Elsmere
have been altered by the subsequent decisions of the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals in MCA Music, Inc, v. Wilson, Tin Pan Apple,
Inc. v. Miller Brewing Company, Inc., and New Line Cinema Corp.
v. Bertelsmann Music Group, Inc. remains a somewhat open
question.
In Wilson, the plaintiffs, owners of the copyright in the song
"Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy of Company B" (a song made famous by
the Andrews Sisters in the 1940's and later covered by Bette Midler)
19. 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980).
20. 482 F. Supp. 741, 747 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
21. 623 F.2d 252, 253 (2d Cir. 1980).
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sued the defendants for their performance of a takeoff entitled
"Cunnilingus Champion of Company C" as part of the show "Let
My People Come." Although the defendants insisted that they had
taken very little from the plaintiff's song, and that they had engaged
in parody of both the song and the contrast of sexual mores between
the 1940's and the present, the district court ruled that the use was
infringing.
Claiming to follow the Mouseketeer case, the lower court errone-
ously stated that a legally permissible parody must be confined to
directly lampooning the underlying song itself. As the facts indi-
cated that this was not such a case, the court applied a general
copyright infringement test resulting in a holding of substantial simi-
larity and infringement. 22
On appeal before Circuit Judges Lombard, Van Graafeiland and
Mansfield, the Court voted 2-1 to affirm, with Mansfield dissenting.
In a confused opinion, the majority first rejected Judge Cooper's
finding below that a parodist must confine his satire to the song be-
ing parodied. The majority also, however, rejected the dictum in
Elsmere that a parody need not have anything to do with the copied
song,23 and seeking to find a middle ground ruled that "a permissi-
ble parody need not be directed solely to the copyrighted song...
[and] may also reflect on life in general... [but] if the copyrighted
song is not at least in part an object of the parody, there is no need
to conjure it up." (emphasis added)., 4
After purporting to apply to the facts in the case the four factors
established in section 107 Of the 1976 U.S. Copyright Act as guide-
lines for the determination of fair use questions, the majority eventu-
ally arrived at the conclusion that the district court had correctly
found that the defendant's parody of sexual mores had no connec-
tion with the plaintiff's song, and therefore could not be fair use.
Judge Van Graafeiland stated:
The district court held that defendants' song was neither a parody
or burlesque of Bugle Boy nor a humorous comment on the music
of the '40's (citation omitted). We are not prepared to hold that a
commercial composer can plagiarize a competitor's copyrighted
song, substitute dirty lyrics of his own, perform it for commercial
gain, and then escape liability by calling the end result a parody
or satire on the mores of society. Such a holding would be an
open-ended invitation to musical plagiarism.
25
22. 425 F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
23. 677 F.2d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 1981) (citing Elsmere Music, Inc. v. NBC, 482 F.
Supp. 741, at 747. "[E]ven if it were found that...[defendants' song] did not parody
the plaintiff's song itself, that finding would not preclude a finding of fair use." 482
F. Supp. 741, at 746).
24. Id.
25. Id.
Stranger in Parodies
Judge Van Graafeiland concluded his discussion of the case's
copyright issues by noting that although the district court had found
the defendant's use of "Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy" was so substan-
tial as to be unfairly excessive, that he "might have reached a differ-
ent conclusion on the same facts."' 26 The judge continued, however,
that since the district court's finding was not "clearly erroneous" on
the substantiality issue, he was inclined to accept their finding as
binding.27
In his well reasoned dissent in Wilson, Judge Mansfield lambasted
District Judge Cooper for the errors of fact and law in his lower
court opinion, and criticized the majority's analysis of the facts
under the fair use doctrine on appeal. 2' His dissent stated that the
defendants clearly were engaged in parody, not only of contempo-
rary sexual mores but of the innocent style of the plaintiff's song and
of the Andrews Sisters' performance of it. As such, he argued, a fair
use analysis was necessarily determinative.
In this regard, Judge Mansfield stated that the defendant had
used only enough of "Bugle Boy" to conjure up a recollection of the
original in the mind of the listener, and that the majority had failed
to focus clearly on the fourth fair use factor, economic harm to the
plaintiff. He asserted that contrary to the majority's conclusions,
there was no evidence that the parody caused any damage to the
plaintiff, or that the defendant's parody, though it was released on
phonorecord as part of a "cast album" from the show, threatened to
usurp the market for the plaintiff's song. On balance, argued the
dissent, the defendant's use of "Bugle Boy" was indeed fair use.
In closing, Judge Mansfield made clear his belief that the majority
opinion was based not so much on legal precedent as it was on the
majority's distaste for the "dirty" nature of the parody. He stated:
In my view the defendants' use of "dirty lyrics" or of language
and allusions that I might personally find distasteful or even offen-
sive is wholly irrelevant to the issue before us, which is whether
the defendants' use, obscene or not, is permissible under the fair
use doctrine as it has evolved over the years. We cannot, under
the guise of deciding a copyright issue, act as a board of censors
outlawing X-rated performances. Obscenity or pornography play
no part in this case. Moreover, permissible parody, whether or not
in good taste, is the price an artist pays for success .... 29
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 188-91 (Mansfield, J. dissenting).
29. Id. at 191. In defense of the majority's decision, it may be pointed out that it
is established that "obscenity" is not protected speech under the First Amendment.
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15
(1973). However, the Wilson majority did not engage in analysis of whether the
lyrics of the defendants' songs were obscene.
In regard to the general question of whether "distasteful" or "dirty" parodies
1990]
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The New Line Cinema and Tin Pan Apple Cases
New Line Cinema Cinema Corp. v. Bertelsmann Music Group30
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) involved a suit brought by the owners of the copy-
rights in the series of horror films known as Nightmare on Elm Street,
featuring the murderous villain Freddy Krueger. During the latter
part of 1987, the plaintiffs decided to authorize the production of a
music video based on the Nightmare series in anticipation of the
release of "Nightmare IV," and began soliciting the interest of rap
music groups to appear in the video.
Rappers "D.J. Jazzy Jeff and the Fresh Prince" composed a song
based upon the film series entitled "Nightmare On My Street,"
which the record/music publishing company to whom they were
under contract - the defendant Bertelsmann - submitted to the plain-
tiffs. After protracted negotiations, no agreement was reached be-
tween the parties. Thereafter, Bertelsmann released a D.J. Jazzy Jeff
record album containing the song "Nightmare On My Street." Sub-
sequently, the plaintiff hired another rap group to produce the
"Nightmare IV" music video. When the plaintiff learned that
Bertelsmann had produced and was attempting to have broadcast a
music video based upon the Jazzy Jeff tune which liberally incorpo-
rated elements of the Nightmare series and the Freddy Krueger
character, it moved successfully for a temporary restraining order.
In a well reasoned opinion, District Judge Robert Ward ruled in
favor of the plaintiff on its motion for a preliminary injunction, en-
joining the release or broadcast of the Jazzy Jeff music video.
Bertelsmann's central defense was that the Jazzy Jeff video repre-
sented a parody of the Nightmare film series and Freddy Krueger
and was thus protected by the fair use doctrine. This was rejected
by Judge Ward after application of the four fair use criteria set forth
have been accorded protection by the courts, it is important to take note of the
decision by the U.S. Supreme Court in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S.
46 (1988). In that case, the nationally renown minister and political commentator
Jerry Falwell sued Hustler Magazine to recover damages for libel and intentional
infliction of emotional distress stemming from an advertisement parody published
by the magazine which depicted Falwell as having had a drunken, incestuous ren-
dezvous with his mother in an outhouse.
The Court ruled unanimously that the state's interest in protecting public figures
from emotional distress is not sufficient to deny First Amendment protection to
speech that is patently offensive, even if intended to inflict emotional injury, when
such speech is clearly satirical in nature and cannot reasonably be interpreted as
stating actual facts about the public figure involved.
It is difficult to ascertain what effect, if any, this decision will have in regard to
the parodying of copyrighted works. The case undoubtedly will be raised, how-
ever, by future parodists defending against accusations that "dirty" satire is pre-
sumptively unfair.
30. New Line Cinema Corp. v. Bertelsmann Music Group, Inc., 693 F. Supp.
1517 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
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in section 107 of the Copyright Act.31
After noting initially that Congress had not classified parody as a
"presumptively fair use,' 32 Judge Ward turned to the threshold
question of whether the Jazzy Jeff video constituted parody at all.
Citing the definition of parody set forth in Dallas Cowboys Cheer-
leaders v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd. (S.D.N.Y. 1979)33 - that "a parody
is a work in which the language or style of another work is closely
imitated or mimicked for comic effect or ridicule"31 4 - Judge Ward
also adopted the caveat added to the definition by the court in
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Cooperative Pro-
ductions, Inc. (N.D. Ga., 1979):
[1]n order to constitute the type of parody eligible for fair use pro-
tection, parody must do more than merely achieve comic effect. It
must also make some critical comment or statement about the
original work which reflects the original perspective of the paro-
dist - thereby giving the parody social value beyond its entertain-
ment function. Otherwise, any comic use of an existing work
would be protected, removing the "fair" aspect of the "fair use"
doctrine and negating the underlying purpose of copyright law of
protecting original works from unfair exploitation by others.
3 5
Unlike the decision of the Appeals Court in Wilson, however,
Judge Ward was unwilling to decide, at least for the purposes of the
preliminary injunction motion, that the defendant's work was not
classifiable as "parody."'38 Recognizing that it was "undisputed that
the [defendant's] music video contains some comic elements and
'pokes fun' at Freddy,"37 Judge Ward found it necessary to apply
the four fair use criteria.
As to the "purpose and character of the use," the court concluded
that the Jazzy Jeff video existed soley as a vehicle to promote the
defendant's song and was "purely commercial." The "nature of the
copyrighted work" - a work of fiction and fantasy as opposed to one
of fact - was also found by the court to mitigate against a finding of
fair use.
Regarding the "amount and substantiality of the use," Judge
Ward adopted a three prong test first announced in Fisher v. Dees
(9th Cir. 1986), discussed infra, to be applied in conjunction with
the "liberal" principle set forth in Elsmere that the parodist may - at
31. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
32. 693 F. Supp. at 1525.
33. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 467 F. Supp.
366 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), all'd, 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979).
34. 693 F. Supp. at 1525 (quoting Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, 467 F. Supp.
at 376).
35. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Cooperative Productions,
Inc., 479 F. Supp. 351, 357 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
36. 693 F. Supp. at 1525.
37. Id.
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minimum - 'conjure up' the parodied work. The three factors to be
considered in determining whether a taking is excessive are: "(1)
the degree of public recognition of the original work; (2) the ease of
conjuring up the original work in the chosen medium; and (3) the
focus of the parody.""8
Judge Ward concluded that because Freddy is a widely recog-
nized character in the Nightmare series, far less than the amount
taken by the defendants, would have sufficed to conjure him up.
Moreover, he added, since both the parody and the parodied work
were produced in the same "audio-visual" medium, ther3 was no
mitigating circumstance requiring the excessive taking. Finally,
even assuming the purpose of the parody was to poke fun at Freddy,
Judge Ward found the defendants took much more "from the origi-
nal than [was] necessary to accomplish reasonably [;heir] parodic
purpose."
3 9
Turning to the fourth and most important factor - the effect of the
use upon the potential market of the underlying work - Judge Ward
determined unequivocally that the Jazzy Jeff video, if released,
would harm the value of the derivative use of the Nightmare series
in the music video market, "a market in which Nightmare has rea-
sonable potential to become commercially valuable.' 4 0 This fourth
factor served to distinguish the instant case from the holding in El-
smere, wherein the appeals court ruled that the "I Love Sodom" par-
ody "has not affected the value of the copyrighted work. Neither
has it - nor could it have - the 'effect of fulfilling the demand of the
original'. ' 4 1 As such, Judge Ward issued an injunction.
Tin Pan Apple, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co.42 arose after the broad-
cast of a television commercial advertisement for the defendant's
beer in which comedian Joe Piscopo allegedly parodied the physi-
cal attributes as well as the performing style, recordings, and copy-
righted songs of the musical group known as "The Fat Boys." The
defendants had previously attempted to hire the group to appear in
the commercial, but the rappers had refused. Thereafter, Piscopo
was hired to perform the parody, in which he was depicted as a
rotund rapper supported by obese background vocalists. .
The group asserted several claims against the defendants, includ-
ing copyright infringement of its songs and sound recordings, false
38. Id. at 1527.
39. Id. (quoting Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 439 (9th Cir. 1986)).
40. Id. at 1528.
41. Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 482 F. Supp. 741, 747
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (quoting Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 545 (2d
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964), aff'd per curiam, 623 F.2d 252 (2d
Cir. 1980).
42. Tin Pan Apple, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 737 F. Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y.
1990).
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advertising, unfair competition, unfair business practices, violation
of privacy and publicity rights, and libel. In analyzing the Fat Boys
case, it is of central importance to note that the opinion addressed a
motion to dismiss the complaint for the failure to state a claim. As
such, Judge Haight was obliged to construe all facts in favor of the
plaintiffs, including the extreme allegation that by "rapping" the
words of the commercial, Piscopo had copied the plaintiff's songs,
which admittedly consist mainly of percussion and lyrics devoid of
melody. 43
Judge Haight first applied a threshold test in order to determine if
the defendant's work constituted a "valid parody." Quoting lan-
guage in the Elsmere opinion which provided that in order to gain
more leeway than the right to merely conjure up a protected work a
parodist must "[build] upon the original... contributing something
new for humorous effect of commentary,"(emphasis omitted),"
Judge Haight concluded restrictively that "building upon the origi-
nal" is a threshold criterium which must be satisfied in order for a
parody to qualify as "valid." Unless such criteria is satisfied, he
wrote, the parody "[does not] qualify even for consideration as an
example of fair use under 107.""
In D.C. Comics, Inc. v. Crazy Eddie, Inc., the district court held,
upon a threshold inquiry, that the defendant's unauthorized use of
the copyrighted "Superman" introduction ("Look ... up in the sky
... it's a bird.., it's a plane.., it's Crazy Eddie!") in its commercials
was not parody but merely "unjustifiable appropriation of copy-
righted material for personal profit." 4 6 Citing to that case, Judge
Haight concluded flatly that the use of appropriated copyrighted
material to promote the sale of commercial products "simply [does]
not qualify as parody.' 4 7
Judge Haight, however, expressed second thoughts about draw-
ing such a conclusion on a threshold inquiry without application of
the section 107 criteria, especially in light of the Supreme Court's
consideration of the "commerciality" issue as part of its fair use
analysis in both its Betamax (1984) and Nation (1985) opinions."
Without reaching a conclusion on the issue, Judge Haight wrote:
I do not think it makes any difference here, since in either event
defendants' commercial does not qualify as parody. The commer-
43. Id. at 827.
44. 737 F. Supp. at 830 (quoting Elsmere, 623 F.2d at 253).
45. 737 F. Supp. at 830.
46. Id. at 831 (quoting D.C. Comics, Inc. v. Crazy Eddie, Inc., 205 U.S.P.Q.
1177, 1178 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)).
47. Id. at 831.
48. Id. at 832 (citing Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417, 451 (1984) and Harper and Row v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539,
562 (1985)).
1990]
22 Entertainment, Media & Intelectual Property Law Forum [Vol. 1
cial's use is entirely for profit: to sell beer. Even if the concept of
parody is impermissibly stretched to include this commercial, it
does not qualify as fair use, since accepting the pertinent allega-
tions of the complaint as true, the commercial in no manner
'builds upon the original,' nor does it contain elements 'contribut-
ing something new for humouous effect or commentary.'
4 9
Clearly, the meandering opinion of the district court in Tin Pan
Apple will not alter the methods of analysis in parody cases estab-
lished by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Elsmere and Wi-
son, and refined by Judge Ward's insightful opinion in New Line
Cinema. Confined to their facts, the Tin Pan Apple and Crazy Eddie
cases merely establish that in the Second Circuit, the parodying of
copyrighted works in a commerical advertising context raises a
nearly irrebuttable presumption against fair use.
The Issue of "Good Faith"
There is one issue of note raised in both the New Line Cinema and
Tin Pan Apple cases which on the surface appears to distinguish
parody law in the Second and Ninth Circuits: the issue of "good
faith." In each of the two cases, the fact that the defendants had
been denied permission to parody the allegedly infringed works by
the plaintiffs was held to be a factor mitigating against fair use.
That is to be contrasted by the Ninth Circuit in Fisher v. Dees (9th
Cir. 1986),so discussed infra, wherein it was held that prior applica-
tion by the defendant to the plaintiff for a license to parody would
not be construed as an indication of the defendant's bad faith. "The
parody defense to copyright infringement," wrote Judge Sneed in
Dees, "exists precisely to make possible a use that generally cannot
be bought.""1
The Dees case, however, involved a defendant who had made a
mere twenty-nine second parodic use of the plaintiff's song on his
record album. Judge Ward, in ruling on the New Line Cinema case,
indicated that such a use was far less intrusive than the intent estab-
lished by Bertelsmann in attempting to release a music video it knew
would supplant the market for the plaintiff's planned project.
"Although normally being refused permission to make a parody
would not be bad faith because parodists, due to the very nature of
their work, are seldom able to get permission from those whose
works are parodied... "wrote Judge Ward, "in this case, [the plain-
tiff's] refusal's [sic] was not due to a concern over being parodied,
but rather due to the fact it had chosen another group to make the
rap video. [The defendant's] decision to make the rap video
49. Id. (quoting Elsmere, 623 F.2d at 253).
50. Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 437 (9th Cir. 1986).
51. Id.
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notwithstanding the fact that it was aware that [the plaintiff] was
making its own video demonstrates bad faith." 2
In the Tin Pan Apple case, Judge Haight placed great weight on
the fact that the defendants - once having been refused cooperation
by the plaintiffs - had used "Look-a-Likes" in its advertisement in a
possible attempt to deceive the public for purely commercial advan-
tage. That situation, he concluded, had to be viewed as bad faith.S3
The two distinct court opinions in the Second Circuit, upon closer
review, seem more to be factual exceptions to the good faith parody
rule set down in Dees than a divergent school of thought. As in all
decisions based upon equitable doctrines such as "good faith," the
inquiry must be fact intensive. Thus, the decision by a parodist
whether to request permission to parody - and in the process risk
establishment of a bad faith motive - must be weighed with the other
facts and circumstances of his activities in mind.
B. The Ninth Circuit "California" View
The judicial history of parody in the Ninth Circuit has followed a
confused route, with no cases involving musical satire having been
decided until the 1986 ruling in Fisher v. Dees.5 4
The Ninth Circuit view of parody had its genesis in two cases de-
cided by District Judge James M. Carter months apart in 1955 -
Loew's v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. (the Jack Benny
Case)"5 and Columbia Pictures v. National Broadcasting Co. (the
Sid Caesar Case)5 6 - with incongruous results.
In the Jack Benny case, decided first, Benny was found guilty of
copyright infringement for parodying the film Gaslight on his televi-
sion show. Judge Carter was extremely hostile to the idea that par-
ody should be treated any differently than any other unauthorized
taking, and ruled that because Benny took "substantial" portions of
the underlying work, he had committed copyright infringement.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's rul-
ing based solely on the "substantiality" issue, stating "[tihe fact that
a serious dramatic work is copied practically verbatim, and then
presented with actors walking on their hands or other grotesqueries,
does not avoid infringement .... .""' In conclusion, the Appeals
Court stated that "[o]ne cannot copy the substance of another's work
without infringing his copyright. A burlesque presentation of such a
copy is no defense to an action for infringement. . ... ,8
52. 693 F. Supp. at 1530 n.ll (citing Fisher at 437).
53. 737 F. Supp. at 832-33.
54. 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986). See infra, notes 65-77.
55. 131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D. Ca. 1955).
56. 137 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Ca. 1955).
57. 239 F.2d 532, 536 (9th Cir. 1956).
58. Id. at 537.
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Some months later, bowing to extreme criticism of his holding in
Benny, Judge Carter announced a completely different parody test
in the Sid Caesar case. Presented with nearly identical facts as in
Benny (Caesar had parodied the film From Here To Eternity on his
own "Your Show of Shows" television program), the Judge ruled
that "[in historical burlesque a part of the content is used to conjure
up, at least the general image, of the original. Some limited taking
should be permitted under the doctrine of fair use, in the case of
burlesque, to bring about this recalling or conjuring up of the
original." 9
Judge Carter did attempt to square the decision in the Caesar
case with his opinion in Benny. He stated that "[u]nlike [the Benny
case], here there was a taking of only sufficient [sic] to cause the
viewer to recall and conjure up the original."' Clearly, however,
he was relying on the Court of Appeals to announce a firm rule for
the Ninth Circuit, and went as far as apologizing for the brevity of
his opinion due to his desire to "speed this case on its way to the
Appellate Court."
The Sid Caesar case never reached the Appellate Court, how-
ever, and so for twenty-three years, until Walt Disney Productions v.
The Air Pirates 6 was decided by the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in 1979, the law of parody in that Circuit was at best vague.
In the Air Pirates case, the defendants had manufactured comic
books which depicted accurately drawn Walt Disney cartoon char-
acters such as Mickey Mouse, Minnie Mouse and Donald Duck en-
gaging in sexual activities and using recreational drugs. Far from
denying their "verbatim" copying, the defendants asserted that "the
humorous effect of parody is best achieved when at first glance the
material appears convincingly to be the original, and upon closer
examination is discovered to be quite something else." (cite
omitted)., 2
District Judge Wollenberg flatly rejected the defendants' argu-
ment, and ignoring Judge Carter's repentance in the Sid Caesar
case, relied on the Ninth Circuit opinion in Benny to hold that any
substantial taking, regardless of its satirical nature, constitutes in-
fringement.63 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed judgement
against the defendants, but limited the Benny case to a "threshold
test" which forbids near verbatim copying (a test which the defend-
ants failed).64 The Air Pirates Court also went on to adopt as a sec-
59. 137 F. Supp. 348, 350 (S.D. Ca. 1955).
60. Id. at 351.
61. 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978).
62. Id. at 758.
63. 345 F. Supp. 108 (N.D. Ca. 1972).
64. 581 F.2d 751, at 757 (9th Cir. 1978).
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ondary test the two-tiered conjure up/market usurpation test
announced by the Second Circuit in the Mad Magazine case.
Ninth Circuit law on parody was less confused after the Air Pi-
rates decision, but the Benny test had retained substantial validity as
the Circuit's parody litmus test. The Fisher v. Dees6' decision in
1986 finally established a comprehensive parody test for the Ninth
Circuit, placing Benny in its proper context.
The Rick Dees Case
In the Rick Dees case, disc jockey Rick Dees recorded and re-
leased a comedy record album containing a parody of the copy-
righted song "When Sunny Gets Blue" which he lampooned as
"When Sonny Sniffs Glue." The parody consisted of the first six
bars of the original song (basically one half of the well known first
verse), and ran for about twenty-nine seconds. Dees changed the
lyrics from "When Sunny Gets Blue, her eyes get grey and cloudy,
then the rain begins to fall" to "When Sonny sniffs glue, her eyes get
red and bulgy, then her hair begins to fall." The parody was also
sung in a style mimicking the distinctive voice of Johnny Mathis,
whose version of the original is the best known. At the conclusion of
twenty-nine seconds, Dee's recorded performance degenerates into
laughter.
Prior to recording the album, Dees had applied to the plaintiff
copyright owner for a license to do the parody, but was vehemently
refused permission. The songwriters Marvin Fisher and Jack Segal
sued Dees for infringement upon the recording's release, but the
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants
without opinion. In a comprehensive and thoughtful appellate
opinion, Judge Sneed, speaking for Judges Wallace and Kozinski,
affirmed the district court's decision.
The Dees opinion first affirmed the Circuit's view that Congress, in
enacting section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act66 had in the legisla-
tive notes accompanying the section specifically enumerated "par-
ody" as one of the examples of an activity subject to fair use. Thus,
the court ruled, the four factors set forth as criteria for determining
fair use in section 107 are to be applied in parody cases.
6 7
Prior to commencing its fair use analysis, however, the court
turned its attention to three allegations by the plaintiffs which as-
serted that the fair use defense was not available to the defendants.
First, Judge Sneed considered the plaintiff's claim that since the par-
ody was not directed at least in part at the plaintiff's song, the fair
use defense should be denied. Without rejecting the principle set
65. 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986).
66. See supra, note 6 at 12.
67. 794 F.2d 432, 435 (9th Cir. 1986).
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forth in the Second Circuit's decision in Wilson (adopted by the
Ninth Circuit in Air Pirates) that there is no justification for conjuring
up an original if it is not at least partly the target of the parody,
Judge Sneed ruled that Dees' parody was intended to poke fun at
the song and Johnny Mathis' singing style, and was not unrelated "to
the song, its place and time."66
In their second allegation, plaintiffs asserted that Dees was barred
from resorting to the fair use doctrine, which "presupposes good
faith," because he acted in bad faith by going ahead with the par-
ody after the plaintiffs had denied him permission to do so. In re-
spouse, Judge Sneed ruled, as previously noted that:
[tihe parody defense to copyright infringement exists precisely to
make possible a use that generally cannot be bought .... More-
over, to consider Dees blameworthy because he asked permission
would penalize him for this modest show of consideration ...
[which] we refuse to discourage .... 69
Finally, the court considered the plaintiff's allegation that because
Dees' parody was "immoral," it could not be protected by fair use.
While refusing to decide whether or not an "obscene" or "immoral"
parody could be a fair use, the court ruled that although Dees' par-
ody was "silly" and "innocuous," it was not obscene.70
The Dees Fair Use Analysis
In its analysis of the first fair use factor, "the purpose and charac-
ter of the use," the court acknowledged the 1984 ruling by the U.S.
Supreme Court in the Betamax case that "every commercial use of
copyrighted material is presumptively... unfair.17 1 Judge Sneed
noted, however, that when the parody is "more in the nature of an
editorial or social commentary than ... an attempt to capitalize fi-
nancially on the plaintiff's original work,"'72 the presumption may be
overcome by the defendant if the parody does not unfairly diminish
the economic value of the original.
The court, therefore, turned to analysis of the fourth fair use factor
("the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work"), taking note of the 1985 U.S. Supreme Court
ruling in the Nation case that the fourth factor "is undoubtedly the
68. Id. at 436. See supra, at 22 for discussion of the "Issue of 'Good Faith'" in
text.
69. Id. at 437.
70. Id.
71. Id. (citing Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451
(1984), which held that the sale of home videotape recorders was not a contribu-
tory infringement of television program copyrights).
72. Id. (citing Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Productions, Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. 124,
131 (N.D. Ga. 1981)).
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single most important element of fair use."' 3 Pointing out that this
economic inquiry regards only whether the parody supplants and
fills the demand of the original, not whether it diminishes the origi-
nal's market potential ("any bad review can have that effect"),
Judge Sneed ruled that Dees' twenty-nine second parody could not
possibly be considered a threat to supplant the plaintiff's famous
love song.7 4 Consequently, the court ruled that factors one and four
supported a finding of fair use.
The court then considered factor three - "the amount and substan-
tiality of the taking" - which it noted had been the central focus of
the Ninth Circuit in parody cases since Benny. After affirming that
the Circuit still recognized that near-verbatim copying could not be
fair use, Judge Sneed clarified that substantial copying is not neces-
sarily unfair in all circumstances. As such, he reformulated the
"conjure up" standard announced in the Sid Caesar case to include
the Second Circuit's holding in Elsmere that conjuring up was the
minimum measure of freedom extended to parodists.75
Judge Sneed then devised a three prong test based on the holding
in Air Pirates to judge whether a particular satirical taking is exces-
sive. These three criteria, which incorporate the Copyright Act's
second fair use factor - "the nature of the copyrighted work," are (1)
the degree of public recognition of the work, (2) the ease of conjur-
ing up the original work in the parodist's chosen medium, and (3)
the focus of the parody.76 In ruling that defendant Dees had not
exceeded the fair use standard, Judge Sneed wrote:
Like a speech, a song is difficult to parody effectively without ex-
act or near-exact copying. If the would-be parodist varies the mu-
sic or meter of the original substantially, it simply will not be
recognizable to the general audience. This 'special need for ac-
curacy' provides some license for 'closer' parody.7 7
In essence, therefore, Judge Sneed's statement limits application
of Benny in musical parody cases to only the most excessive exam-
ples of verbatim copying. Since application of all four fair use fac-
tors yielded a balance in favor of the defendant, the court ruled in
favor of Dees.
73. Id. (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S.
539, 566 (1985), holding that a magazine's unauthorized publication of quotations
from a former president's unpublished memoirs did infringe the copyright therein,
and was not a fair use permitted under 17 U.S.C. § 107).
74. Id. at 438.
75. Id. at 438-39.
76. Id. at 439.
77. Id.
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C. A Final Summary of Current Law in the Second and
Ninth Circuits
With the Second Circuit's rulings in Elsmere, Wilson, New Line
Cinema, and Tin Pan Apple, and the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Dees, the rules applying to music parody (and to parody in general)
in each circuit seem to have finally merged into a nearly identical
body of law. This is best illustrated through reference to and com-
parison of the three basic elements of parody analysis which both
Circuits have adopted:
1. The Two-Tiered Validity/Nexus Threshold Test
As established in the Ninth Circuit by Dees and in the Second
Circuit by the Mouseketeer case, Wilson, New Line Cinema, Tin
Pan Apple and Crazy Eddie, the parody defense is subject to a
two-tiered threshold determination of "validity" and "nexus."
Firstly, the defendant must have made at least some critical com-
ment or statement reflecting his original perspective "giving the
[derivative work] social value beyond its entertainment func-
tion." 78 Secondly, although parody need not be directed soley at
the original underlying work, the original must at least in part be
an object of the parody (establishing a "nexus" between the par-
ody and the allegedly infringed copyright).
Thus, absent cursory proof that the defendant has engaged in a
valid attempt to parody, and that the plaintiff's copyrighted work
is at least in part an object of such parody, the court may deter-
mine that a full fair use analysis is unnecessary and that a strict
copyright infringement test is the proper standard.
2. The Verbatim-Copying Threshold Test
The Ninth Circuit still recognizes the Benny threshold test that
substantial, near-verbatim copying precludes the necessity for ap-
plication of a fair use test. The holding in Dees, however, indi-
cates that at least in cases of musical parody, the parodist will fail
to satisfy the threshold standard in only the most eggregious cases
of verbatim copying.
The Second Circuit has adopted a similar rule stemming from
the Mouseketeer case: that the need to apply a full fair use analy-
sis to a parody is eliminated when copying is so obviously exces-
sive as to negate the possibility of a finding of fair use regardless
of other circumstances. 79
78. New Line Cinema Corp. v. Bertelsmann Music Group, Inc., 693 F. Supp.
15 17-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (quoting Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta
Cooperative Productions, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 351, 357 (N.D. Ga. 1979)).
79. 389 F. Supp. 1397 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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3. The Fair Use Test
Unless the parodist has failed to pass one or more of the above
threshold tests, both Circuits recognize that the proper method to
be used in determining the permissibility of a parody is analysis
pursuant to the four fair use factors set forth in section 107 of the
U.S. Copyright Act.
a. The "Commerciality" Presumption and the
"Nature of the Use"
In regard to the first fair use factor - "the nature of the use" - the
U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Betamax that any commercial use
creates a rebuttable presumption of unfaimess.80 As such, each
of the two Circuits is bound to accept this precedent in analyzing
fair use defenses to infringement. Relying in part on Betamax, the
Second Circuit district court ruling in the Tin Pan Apple case es-
tablished that parody of a copyrighted work in a commercial ad-
vertising context will almost never constitute fair use.
Neither Circuit has ruled specifically as to whether the "im-
moral" or "obscene" nature of a parody either pre-empts a finding
of fair use or creates a presumption against it. It should be noted,
however, that in each of the modem parody cases involving alleg-
edly "immoral" or "dirty" uses (the Mouseketeer case, Air Pirates,
and Wilson), the plaintiff has prevailed decisively. These results
are more than mere coincidences, and should be seriously noted
by parodists.
b. The "Market Usurpation" Test
Both Circuits must recognize, pursuant to the U.S. Supreme
Court's holding in the Nation case,8 1 that the fourth fair use factor
- market usurpation - is the most important fair use inquiry.
c. Substantality and the Expanded "Conjure-Up" Standard
Finally, both Circuits recognize that in judging the substantiality
of a parodist's use of an underlying work (the third fair use factor),
the parodist may, at a minimum, use enough to "conjure-up" the
original, but may use more in cases in which a special need to do
so can be proven. In both Circuits (Elsmere, New Line Cinema,
Dees) it has been recognized that musical parody often requires
substantial use of the original musical work to conjure it up in the
mind of the listener. The scope of such substantial use will be
determined by such factors as the popularity or familiarity to the
public of the original, whether the original is a central focus of the
parody itself, and the nature of the parody (i.e., political commen-
80. See supra, note 71 at 26.
81. See supra, note 73 at 27.
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tary). This test incorporates the second fair use factor set forth in
section 107 of the Act, "the nature of the copyrighted work."8 2
Thus, a restatement of the current law as it exists today in both
Circuits can be formulated to facilitate analysis of the various forms
of musical parody:
1. So long as the parodist does not engage in excessive, near
verbatim copying, and as long as there is at least some nexus be-
tween the subject of the parody and the copyrighted work utilized
by the parodist, the parody is subject to a fair use analysis under
section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act.
2. In such fair use analysis, the court must presume that commer-
cial uses - especially in the advertising of products - are unfair.
But such presumptions may in some cases be overcome by proof
that the parody does not supplant or fill the demand in the market-
place of the original, and that the parodist did not intend that it do
so (illustrating good faith).
The Court must also consider, but accord less importance to,
the substantiality of the parodist's taking. A parodist may utilize
enough of an original to, at minimum, conjure it up. Somewhat
greater leeway is afforded musical parodists who often have a
special need for accuracy, the amount depending upon the famili-
arity of the public with the original, the extent to which the origi-
nal work is itself the subject of the parody and the nature of the
parody in relation to First Amendment considerations.
3. There is a noticeable judicial trend that parodists who engage
in the use of "obscene," "immoral," or "dirty" elements in their
parodies are often given less leeway to take from original works.
II. MUSICAL WORKS AND THE COPYRIGHT LAW
In applying the laws of parody and fair use to specific instances of
musical satire, it is also important to distinguish between the types of
copyrighted musical works which may be subject to parody, and the
differing rights bestowed by the U.S. Copyright Act upon the copy-
right owners.of each respective type of work. The principal distinc-
tion in this regard is the differing rights granted by the Act to owners
of copyrights in sound recordings, as opposed to those granted to
copyright owners of musical compositions or audio visual works
such as music videos.
A. Sound Recordings
Section 106 of the Copyright Act grants to authors of copyright-
able works several distinct rights, including the right to reproduce
and distribute the work in copies or phonorecords, the right to pre-
pare derivative works, and the right to publicly perform the work.8"
82. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (1990).
83. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1990).
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Section 114 of the Act, however, places limitations on these rights in
regard to sound recordings: the copyright owner is denied both per-
forming rights, and the right to limit "sound alike" recordings.8 4
Thus, unless the parodist duplicates portions of the original sound
recording by converting the actual recorded sounds embodied on
the original to his own use, there can be no infringement under the
Copyright Act of the rights in the original sound recording. A paro-
dist may therefore imitate a sound recording "note for note," exactly
mimicking a performer associated with it in "sound alike" fashion,
and perform such a parody or sell a recording of it, without infring-
ing the original sound recording copyright. This is not to say, how-
ever, that such actions by the parodist do not violate the rights of the
lampooned performer under both unfair competition laws (which
basically protect against false designation as to goods and services)
and right of publicity statutes."' Naturally, the rights of the copy-
right owner in the underlying musical composition embodied in the
sound recording might also be infringed.
It does mean, however, that a parodist could take a copyrighted
sound recording of a musical composition in the pubic domain, such
as Jimi Hendrix's recording of "The Star Spangled Banner," and
perform or re-record the composition in full in any medium exactly
as it sounds on the record, supplying any type of satirical lyrics or
commentary, without the risk of infringing the rights of any copy-
right owners.
B. Musical Compositions
The rights of the copyright owner of a musical composition estab-
lished in section 106 of the Act do extend to performance, repro-
duction, and distribution rights and the right to prepare derivative
works, but are subject to the compulsory mechanical licensing pro-
84. 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (1990).
1 14(b) reads in relevant part as follows:
The exclusive right of the owner of copyright in a sound recording...
do[es] not extend to the making or duplication of another sound recording
that consists entirely of an independent fixation of other sounds, even
though such sounds imitate or simulate those in the copyrighted sound
recording.
85. See Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F. 2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988). The defend-
ant advertisers had used a vocal impersonator to imitate Midler's voice and perform
one of her best known songs for a commercial. Midler's tort claim was based in
part on California's right of privacy statute. The Ninth Circuit held that Midler had
a common law property right in her voice, and that the defendants had consciously
misappropriated that property right. "A voice is as distinctive and personal as a
face." Id. at 463.
The various right of publicity and unfair competition claims that a performer may
raise in such a sound alike case are beyond the scope of this article. See generally
Comment, Whose Voice Is It Anyway? Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 8 Cmumozo Awrs &
ErNzrr~mMwrr L. J. 201 (1989).
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visions of section 115.86 The compulsory license provisions were
originally established in the 1909 U.S. Copyright Act to ensure the
widest dissemination and availability of musical works to the
public. 7
Section 115 of the Act provides that once a non-dramatic musical
composition 8 has been recorded and released to the public in the
U.S., any person may legally record a version of the composition
and release it to the public on phonorecords by following the licens-
ing provisions provided in the Act and paying the applicable roy-
alty rates to the copyright owner.8 9 The current compulsory royalty
rate set by the Copyright Royalty Tribunal is 5.7 cents (or 1.1 cent
per minute, whichever is larger) per song for each copy manufac-
tured and sold.90
Naturally, the question arises whether a parodist may secure a
compulsory mechanical license to cover his use of a musical compo-
sition as part of a parody. Section 11 5(a)(2) provides that "a com-
pulsory license includes the privilege of making a musical
arrangement of the work to the extent necessary to conform it to the
style or manner of interpretation of the performance involved, but
the arrangement shall not change the basic melody or fundamental
character of the work ... .,91
The House of Representative's Report on the Copyright Act ex-
plains that this clause is to prevent the musical work from being
"perverted, distorted or travestied" by the compulsory mechanical
licensee.92 Thus, although minor lyrical changes (such as those
based on gender) are permitted under the compulsory license, ex-
tensive parody of the music or lyrics would likely not be
permissible.
9 3
86. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (1990).
87. Congress sought to prevent the possible development of a strong music mo-
nopoly. 2 M. Nnaxn, Nmam Ox CopvmoHr § 8.04[C], at 8-56 (rev. ed. 1990).
88. A non-dramatic musical composition is a musical composition which is not
an integrated part of a dramatic work. 1 M. Nuansz § 2.06[A, B, C, D], at 59-66
(rev. ed. 1990).
89. 17 U.S.C. 115 (1990).
90. 37 C.F.R. § 307.3. The royalty rate is revised biennially, in direct propor-
tion to changes in the Consumer Price Index. Id.
91. 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2) (1990).
92. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 109 (1976).
93. Occcasionally, a recording artist will utilize the music of a copyrighted song
without significantly changing it as the basis for a new, generally non-satirical ver-
sion with particularly expanded or substituted lyrics. This is most common in the
folk genre, where verses concerning current social or political events are inserted
into new versions of classic folk songs. The author of the new version is generally
not given authorship rights, but if the underlying tune is in the public domain the
author of the new lyrics may be entitled to protection and certain songwriter royal-
ties based on his creative contribution to the "new" work.
Perhaps the best pop music example was the use by The Beach Boys' Brian Wil-
son of the music to the Chuck Berry song "Sweet Little Sixteen" as the basis for the
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Using the facts in the Dees case as an example, the extensive lyric
changes in the twenty-nine second parody done by the defendant on
the song "When Sunny Gets Blue" removed it from the scope of the
compulsory license provisions. Rick Dees could not, even if he so
desired, have secured a compulsory license for his use (thereby cir-
cumventing the plaintiff copyright owners' cause of action against
him). He was limited to requesting a mechanical recording license
directly from the copyright owners, and that having been denied, to
rely upon the fair use doctrine.
What if Dees had limited his parody of the love song to an outra-
geous musical treatment, incorporating gunshots, whistles, sirens
and screams (much in the way Spike Jones arranged "Some En-
chanted Evening"), but without changing the lyrics? There is at
least some question as to whether such a satirical performance
would constitute a change in the "fundamental character" of the
song as prohibited under section 11 5(a)(2). That issue has not been
decided by any court in the years since enactment of the 1976
Copyright Act, and represents a potential cause of action for the
paternalistic musical copyright owner wishing to protect the "integ-
rity" of the work in cases of subjectively extreme musical
treatments.94
C. Audio Visual Works
While the scope of this article is generally limited to analysis of
aural music parodies, it is important to note certain distinctions con-
cerning the parodying of music videos.
The rights of the copyright owner of an audio-visual work such as
a music video extend to performance, reproduction, distribution, de-
rivative and all other rights set forth in Section 106 of the Copyright
Act, and are not limited by a compulsory license scheme. 95 The
parodying of audio-visual works, therefore, requires voluntary li-
censing by the copyright owner unless the use falls within the pa-
rameters of the fair use doctrine.
In the case of music videos, the copyright owner of the work is
often the record company which advanced the money for its pro-
hit "Surfin USA." Brian Wilson was able to arrange a deal with Arc Music, Inc.,
owners of "Sweet Little Sixteen," after release of "Surfin' USA," whereby Wilson
reportedly shared in mechanical, synchronization and print royalties generated by
the new version, but gets no authorship credit and does not share in performance
royalties.
94. The United States recently ratified the Berne Convention. Berne does afford
special "moral" rights protecting the "integrity" of a work. However, the U.S. spe-
cifically adopted language that such rights would not supplant established U.S.
law. Some commentators nonetheless maintain that U.S. ratification of Berne may
expand "moral rights" in this country.
95. 17 U.S.C. § 106, § 115 (1990).
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duction. Thus, when parodist Wierd Al Yankovic parodied Michael
Jackson's music video of the song "(I'm) Bad" as "(I'm) Fat" by
nearly recreating it (replete with Wierd Al imitating Jackson's dance
steps in a subway environment, dressed up in a "fat suit" as a four
hundred pound, leather clad version of the pop star), he licensed
such use of the copyright in the "Bad" video from CBS Records,
Inc., recognizing that his taking was too broad to qualify as fair use.
CBS, in consultation with Michael Jackson, limited Wierd Al's use to
performance of his parody video on television, declining to permit
home video sale. The particular terms of such licensing agreements
will depend upon the bargaining power of each of the parties, and
the potential profitability of the project.
III. SPECIFIC MUSICAL PARODIES CONSIDERED
Finally, we turn to consideration of the practical applications of
the law, and of business customs of the entertainment industry, to
specific instances of musical parody. To facilitate this analysis, musi-
cal parodies may be divided into five basic categories: (a) lyric par-
odies; (b) parodies of celebrities and performers utilizing unaltered
copyrighted music; (c) parodies utilizing musical allusions to pre-
existing copyrighted musical works; (d) sound recording sampling
and splicing, and; (e) parodies in commercial advertising. Through
analysis of various examples in each of these categories, practical
legal and business guidance on the parody issue may be
ascertained.
A. Lyric Parodies
Lyric parodies generally consist of the wholesale adoption of the
instrumental and melodic portions of a copyrighted musical work to
which the parodist adds or substitutes his own lyrics. The commer-
cial success of several lyric parodists, such as Allan Sherman and
Weird Al Yankovic, indicate that this popular form of parody may
be the most commercially viable. It should be noted, however, that
lyric parodies almost always fall outside the scope of the fair use
doctrine due to the extensive nature of the taking in most cases, and
require licensing prior to publication, as discussed below.
1. Weird Al Yankovic: Licensing With Leverage
Recording artist Weird Al Yankovic released several parody rec-
ord albums during the 1980's lampooning then current musical hits.
The aural parodies and accompanying music video satires have re-
ceived extensive air play on radio and television, and over 3 million
copies of Weird Al Yankovic's phonorecords have been sold.96
96. Telephone interview with Chuck Hurewitz, Esq. (April 16, 1990).
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Weird Al's parodies generally consist of independently recorded,
painstakingly accurate "sound alike" instrumental tracks of entire
hit recordings, over which he records parody lyrics of the underly-
ing musical composition, often sung in a style mimicking the per-
former which appeared on the hit recording.
As noted above, Mr. Yankovic's "sound alike" re-recordings of
the original records do not run afoul of the copyright owner's rights
in such original recordings, pursuant to section 114 of the Copy-
right Act. Likewise, since there is no threat of "confusion" in the
marketplace caused by his parodies, lampooned recording artists
are unlikely to have a cause of action against Mr. Yankovic based
on violation of the various unfair competition statutes.
It is the rights of the copyright owners in the original underlying
songs and music videos satirized by Weird Al, however, whose
rights stand to be infringed by the performance and sale of his paro-
dies. Moreover, Mr. Yankovic's ability to rely on the fair use doc-
trine to excuse the unlicensed uses of the songs and music videos he
parodies is extremely doubtful.
Application of the "verbatim copying" threshold test would pres-
ent an insurmountable hurdle to any claim of fair use by Mr.
Yankovic. 7 His taking of the full chord structure, melody, and por-
tions of the lyrics of the original underlying musical compositions
which he parodies is clearly substantial enough to pre-empt a find-
ing of fair use as a matter of law, regardless of any number of "miti-
gating" circumstances which might exist. The same is true of his
near-verbatim takings of the accompanying music videos which he
sometimes parodies along with the song and sound recording.
Even assuming that Mr. Yankovic could survive application of the
verbatim copying threshold test, and taking into account that there
is no reason to suspect he would fail the "nexus" threshold test or
run afoul of presumptions concerning obscenity, Mr. Yankovic
would still not be able to satisfy the burden of proving fair use.
Firstly, since his parodies are created for commercial sale, Weird Al
would have to overcome the Betamax presumption that such uses
are unfair.
Further, because Mr. Yankovic's parodies often so closely parallel
the original underlying song and video, it cannot be concluded with
confidence that the parodies will not at least partially supplant the
original in the marketplace. The parody and the original often get
airplay on the same radio and televsion stations, and often cater to
the same segment of the record-buying public. Although Mr.
Yankovic could claim that his recordings and video parodies actu-
ally revive sales of songs which have fallen from the charts by the
time his parodies are recorded and released, there remains a strong
97. Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 437 (9th Cir. 1986).
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chance that a court might find his work fails to clear the most impor-
tant parody hurdle: the market usurpation test.
Finally, as noted, Mr. Yankovic's use of the original underlying
songs and music videos substantially exceeds the "conjure-up" stan-
dard, bordering closely on near-verbatim copying. The general
lack of social or political content of his parodies also limits reliance
on First Amendment considerations to expand the scope of permissi-
ble use.
Having concluded that his song and video parodies are not le-
gally characterizable as fair uses, Mr. Yankovic licenses all of the
musical compositions and music videos he parodies directly from
their respective copyright owners. According to his attorney,
Chuck Hurewitz of the Beverly Hills law firm of Cooper, Epstein and
Hurewitz, Weird Al generally gets a writing credit and a copyright
interest in the song parody, which he shares (in varying royalty ra-
tios) with the writers of the original underlying work. The publish-
ing rights in the parody are most often conveyed to the copyright
owner of the original song, usually a music publisher, which in turn
issues instructions to the applicable rights societies as to division of
performance royalties on the parody, issuance of mechanical
licenses for sale of the parody to the public in the form of pho-
norecords, and licensing of synchronization rights in the parody for
its use in audio visual works such as music videos. Certain contrac-
tual limitations may be placed on the music publisher regarding its
right to exploit the parody without the prior consent of Wierd Al. As
noted above, license to utilize the underlying music video in a par-
ody is done on a negotiated basis with terms of compensation vary-
ing from a flat fee buyout to royalty participation.
Mr. Hurewitz asserts that Weird Al's substantial market success is
responsible for the willingness of copyright owners to grant him per-
mission to parody their musical compositions, and has made it possi-
ble for Yankovic to bargain for a lucrative share in the copyright of
the parody version of the song. He further surmises that fledgling
parodists and comedians are often denied permission to parody by
copyright owners who believe the sell-evident risks of damaging the
value of their copyright by permitting the parody is not offset by a
"guarantee" of financial return which Weird Al can provide.
That view is partially refuted by attorney Stuart Prager of the New
York law firm Abeles, Osterberg and Clark, who represents an ama-
teur "yuppie musical parody group" called "The V.P.'s." Mr.
Prager reports that the group was able to secure permission to rec-
ord lyric parodies of full original songs from their respective copy-
right owners in nearly all cases in which permission was requested.
The group has been forced, however, to assign the rights of their
parodies to the copyright owners of the original songs in each case,
without retaining a royalty participation right in the derivative par-
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ody copyrights. Thus, "The V.P.'s" hope to earn artist royalties from
the sale of their parody records, but will receive no mechanical,
performance or other writer royalties for themselves as a condition
of their license to parody the underlying musical compositions.
2. Allan Sherman: Increasing the Parodist's Income
Certainly the forerunner of Weird Al in popularity as a lyric paro-
dist was the late humorist Allan Sherman. During the early to mid-
nineteen sixties, Sherman's song parody l.p.'s sold millions of cop-
ies, and several of his "single" releases - most notably "Hello Mud-
dal, Hello Faddah" - spent several weeks on the pop charts.
Sherman's modus operendi was to utilize mostly public domain
musical material as the basis for his lyric parodies, occasionally li-
censing "standards" like "Five Foot Two, Eyes of Blue" in the rare
instances in which his lampoons were based on protected music.
Since the label copy on his albums does not list him as a writer on
the parodies of licensed copyrighted compositions, it is assumed
that he did not share in publishing royalties on those tunes. Mr.
Sherman discovered, however, that he could earn significant
mechanical publishing royalties by writing full comedy songs him-
self and including them on his albums along with the parodies. This
shrewd practice is also engaged in by other parodists like Weird Al,
and by recording artists throughout the record industry.
3. Blowfly: Obscene Uses and Willfull Infringement
"Blowfly" has been an underground cult recording artist and per-
former for decades, distributing records of his sexually explicit lyric
parodies of rock and roll hits mostly through the illegal black mar-
ket. Several copyright owners have attempted over the years to en-
join his activities. Blowfly, however, has continued to resurface with
new records every few years.
Blowfly and other "blue" parodists are generally unable to secure
voluntary licenses from copyright owners whose musical composi-
tions they wish to parody, and fair use protections have historically
been denied to "dirty" lyric parodies. Thus some parodists are faced
with a choice between not publishing at all, or operating outside of
the law. In light of the potentially devastating statutory damages for
willfull copyright infringement of up to $100,000 per copyright, the
unlicensed parodist who clearly falls outside the scope of the fair
use doctrine takes a substantial financial risk by going forward with
publication, and could even be subject to criminal prosecution.9"
The Blowfly-styled parodist is forewarned, therefore, that he may in-
deed be forced to suffer for his art if and when copyright owners
catch up with him.
98. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (1990).
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4. Radio Station Promo Parodies
During the 1980's many radio stations with popular music formats
began widely incorporating humor, including lyric parodies based
on pop songs, into their talk segments and musical segues. The par-
odies proved so popular with radio audiences that soon parody pro-
duction houses began springing up to provide material to radio
stations and syndicated radio networks. Some syndicated radio per-
sonalities such as Howard Stem, Rick Dees, and Don Imus hired
staffers specifically for their ability to produce lyric parodies.
These parodies are often never released to the public as phono-
records, but are limited in distribution to radio d.j.'s. The owner of
the underlying composition will nonetheless retain a cause of action
for violation of his right of public performance.99 Performing rights
licenses issued to the broadcaster by ASCAP, BMI and SESAC loo
do not authorize the performance of such parodies. The licenses
granted by those organizations grant only the right to publicly per-
form the separate musical compositions in the organizations' reper-
tory. These licenses do not authorize licensees to make substantial
changes to the individual songs such as the changes required to cre-
ate a lyric parody. Whether or not such musical parodies are pro-
tected under the fair use doctrine depends on the application, on a
case by case basis, of the principles set forth above.10 1
An interesting issue that the performing rights organizations face
in this area is, assuming that the creator of the parody did not enter
into an agreement with respect to performing royalties with the
copyright owner of the original work, should the organization pay
the composer and publisher of the original work for performances
of the parody?
This issue arose at BMI in connection with Weird Al Yankovic's
parody of Michael Jackson's music video of the song "(I'm) Bad" as
"(I'm) Fat." BMI represents the performing rights in Jackson's songs
including "(I'm) Bad." BMI paid 100% of performing royalties in
connection with "(I'm) Fat" to Jackson based on an agreement be-
tween Jackson and Weird Al under which the latter agreed to cede
99. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (1990).
100. American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP); Broad-
cast, Music, Inc. (BMI); Society of European Stage Authors and Composers(SESAC). These societies license the performing rights for songs in the U.S. to vir-
tually all recorded musical works on behalf of the music copyright owner constitu-
ents (songwriters and music publishers). See e.g., ASCAP Local Station Blanket
Radio License (1990).
101. It is speculated that many music copyright owners decline to exercise their
rights against broadcasters to enjoin the creation and broadcast of unauthorized
parodies, for fear that the broadcasters may retaliate by refusing to play the songs
owned by such copyright owner during the broadcaster's regular programming.
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any performing royalties otherwise due to him from performances of
"(I'm) Fat."
B. Parodies and Impressions of Celebrities Uflizing
Unaltered Copyrighted Music
This second type of musical satire parallels the very first U.S. par-
ody cases, discussed above. They held that musical impressionists
need not procure performance licenses for the utilization of copy-
righted music in their performances, so long as the parodist acts in
"good faith," neither attempting to usurp the market of the original
music, nor utilizing more of the original than needed to effectively
convey the parody to the audience.
1. Joe Piscopo Parodies Frank Sinatra - The Segmented Taking
In 1982, comedian Joe Piscopo recorded and released an ex-
tended-play phonorecord called "The I Love Rock And Roll Med-
ley," which featured his comedic impression of crooner Frank
Sinatra singing a medley of popular hard rock tunes rearranged and
recorded in the big band style for which Sinatra is famous. Mr. Pis-
copo utilized musical segments of varying length from each of eight
songs including "I Love Rock And Roll" (1:02), "Cold As Ice" (:32),
"Under My Thumb" (:33), "Hit Me With Your Best Shot" (: 11),
"Born To Run" (:53), "I Know What Boys Like" (:12), "Smoke On
The Water" (:12) and "Life During Wartime" (:33). Lyric changes
were minimal, designed to accommodate Mr. Sinatra's highly styl-
ized singing (for example, the lyrics "I love rock and roll" were at
times scatted by Mr. Piscopo as "I love dooby doo").
Although it is possible that under current parody precedents Pis-
copo's segmented utilization of at least certain of the shorter uses of
the eight musical compositions could qualify as fair use, the produ-
cers (undoubtedly with the Air Pirates and Wilson cases in mind)
licensed each of the compositions in 1982 from the copyright own-
ers at reduced mechanical royalty rates. Such reduced rates are
sometimes granted by copyright owners for medley recordings, usu-
ally, as in this case, on a most favored nations basis (e.g. that no
other copyright owner receive a more favorable rate in connection
with the medley). This licensing arrangement enabled Piscopo's
record company to release the parody on a profitable basis, while
also permitting protection against exposure to infringement suits by
copyright owners who may have disputed Piscopo's claims of fair
use protection.
2. Springsteen Meets The Flintstones - The Full Taking
In 1986, a parodist calling himself "Bruce Springstone" recorded
the song "(Meet) The Flintstones" in the performing and speaking
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style of Bruce Springsteen. According to attorney Steve Winograd-
sky of Hanna Barbera, copyright owners of the song "(Meet) The
Flintstones," the parodists applied retroactively for a mechanical li-
cense at the statutory rate which the company granted. Mr. Wi-
nogradsky stated his belief that the Springstone parody falls within
the compulsory licensing provisions of section 115 of the Copyright
Act. In his opinion, although the use is a "reinterpretation" of the
song, it does not represent a change in "the basic melody, lyrics or
its fundamental character."
Mr. Winogradsky did admit that a more "paternalistic" copyright
owner could argue that the parodist's addition of an extensive spo-
ken introduction and embellishment of his arrangement with brief
musical quotes from various Springsteen songs took the Springstone
use outside the scope of section 115. Argued successfully, these
points could enable the owner to prevent a similar use, or to exact a
settlement establishing a licensing fee higher than the compulsory
mechanical royalty rate. As there was no risk of public confusion as
to the source of the parody, it is doubtful that Bruce Springsteen had
any legal basis to enjoin its dissemination.
3. Political Satire
In the mid-1980's an unidentified parodist produced and distrib-
uted for television broadcast a clay animation music video depicting
former New York mayor Ed Koch singing a full rendition of the song
"New York, New York" in his distinctive speaking style.
Similarly, the Washington, D.C.-based singing group known as
"The Capitol Steps" have become somewhat of an institution in the
nation's capitol by performing parodies of popular songs which lam-
poon political figures and current events. The group sells record-
ings of their collected parodies, which individually vary in length
from a few bars of a song to an entire parody rendition. The under-
lying works are not licensed.
Although in both these cases the taking of a full song undoubt-
edly exceeds the established fair use boundaries for parody, the is-
sue is raised whether the lampooning of a political figure expands
the scope of permissible unlicensed use of the underlying musical
composition. Consideration of the "nature of the parody" as part of
the fair use analysis has long been recognized by the courts, reflect-
ing the first of the fair use factors set forth in section 107 of the
Copyright Act: "the purpose and character of the use." No re-
ported case has overtly considered this First Amendment issue in the
parody context, but several courts have grappled with the question
of how much First Amendment freedom of speech rights (protecting
and fostering the "free flow of ideas") should impact on the fair u'e
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question. 1 0 2
These cases have ruled that on matters of extreme public impor-
tance, the scope of the fair use doctrine is expanded. However, the
U.S. Supreme Court made clear in the Nation case that even the
memoirs of a former U.S. president cannot be substantially utilized
(at least prior to their first publication) without license if such use is
commercial in nature.
10 3
Thus, although there is probably a certain amount of increased
latitude extended to parodists by the fair use doctrine in cases in
which the object of the parody is political satire, a full taking of the
entire underlying original song most likely cannot be justified under
any circumstances as permissible fair use.
C. Parodies Utiing Musical Allusions to Copyrighted
Songs
Sometimes musical satirists utilize mere elements of music associ-
ated with the lampooned subject as a basis for the creation of "new"
music for use in the parody. This type of parody is best illustrated
by two feature length audio-visual projects, Eddie and The Cruisers
and All You Need Is Cash, each of which utilized musical parody
extensively in satirizing the recording artists Bruce Springsteen and
The Beatles, respectively. The soundtrack of Mel Brook's film send-
up of Alfred Hitchcock movies, High Anxiety, is also a good exam-
ple of musical allusion as a tool of the parodist.
1. "Eddie and The Cruisers"
In the case of "Eddie and The Cruisers," the plot of the film in-
volved the brief musical career of a mythical New Jersey shore band
in the early 1960's led by a street-wise songwriter fond of writing
about cars, youthful dreams of escape, and the magical qualities of
life on the boardwalk near Asbury Park. Many of the songs used in
the film, written and performed by the real life band "John Cafferty/
Beaver Brown," incorporated short musical quotes from several
102. Wainwright Sec. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91 (1977) (hold-
ing that where defendants copied, almost verbatim, the most creative and original
parts of plaintiff's research reports, with intent to profit by filling demand for the
original work, defendant could not claim fair use nor use implicating First Amend-
ment interests) ("The fair use doctrine offers a means of balancing the exclusive
rights of a copyright holder with the public's interest in dissemination of informa-
tion affecting areas of universal concern, such as art, science or industry." Id. at
94.); See e.g., Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061 (1977) (holding that a defendant
biographer's unauthorized use of copyrighted letters written by plaintiffs' parents
may be so substantial that it deprived defendant of the fair use defense) ("For a
determination whether the fair use defense is applicable... ,it is relevant whether
or not the [copied materials] were used primarily for scholarly, historical reasons, or
predominantly for commercial exploitation." Id. at 1069.)
103. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
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songs written and recorded in the 1970's by Bruce Springsteen, a
street-wise songwriter from the New Jersey shore who had written
many songs about cars, youthful dreams of escape, and the magical
qualities of life on the boardwalk near Asbury Park.
The actual use of copyrightable material from Springsteen's songs
by Beaver Brown, although minimal, was just enough to "conjure
up" several of Springsteen's works by adopting short musical
phrases to create a general "feel" of the originals. For example, the
"Bo Didley/Not Fade Away" backbeat used by Springsteen in
"She's The One" was conjured up in style and substance in the
movie's hit song, "On The Dark Side;" likewise, the descending
chromatic line in Springsteen's "Born To Run," which occurs just
before the pause prior to the last verse, is unmistakably repeated at
the conclusion of Cafferty's "Boardwalk Angel."
According to Steve Rubin of Scotti Brothers Records (the sound-
track distributor), the principals involved in the production and re-
lease of the film and accompanying soundtrack believed they had
the protection of the fair use doctrine, and relied upon it without
licensing the Springsteen compositions. No legal actions have
arisen since the film's initial release in 1983.
2. The Ruttles
In 1978, the NBC television network broadcast a television movie
in the U.S. entitled "All You Need Is Cash," a parody of the rise and
fall of rock's greatest icons, The Beatles (parodied by the producers
as "The Ruffles"). Included in the program were fourteen
"Beatlesque" songs written by producer Neil Innes as musical paro-
dies of some of the many famous Beatle hits.
Many of the Innes songs relied on very brief musical quotes from
several different Beatles' songs and recordings, seemingly well
within the boundaries of the "conjure-up" standard of fair use. At
least four of the songs, however, could be viewed as substantially
similar in chord structure and melody (and in production technique,
which should not be included as part of the similarity test because of
the "sound alike" exemption of section 114) to the original Lennon
and McCartney songs they parodied: "With A Girl Like You" (paro-
dying "If I Fell"), "Ouch" ("Help"), "Good Times Roll" ("Lucy In
The Sky With Diamonds") and "Piggy In The Middle" ("I Am The
Walrus").
The audio-visual work "All You Need Is Cash" and the compen-
dium sound track album "The Ruttles" were released without
licenses from the copyright owners of the parodied Lennon and Mc-
Cartney songs. Under threat of litigation by the copyright owners,
however, the producers were said to have relented and retroactively
applied for mechanical and synchronization licenses for use of the
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underlying original songs in the television program and on the com-
pendium soundtrack.
Again, as in the Joe Piscopo/Frank Sinatra situation, the produ-
cers seemed to have learned it was easier and cheaper in the long
run to license their uses of pre-existing copyrighted music than to
attempt to rely on the fair use doctrine, risking litigation expenses,
statutory damages and the devastating effect of an injunction (which
could interfere with the program's broadcast and the distribution of
the soundtrack album, killing the whole project).
3. Mel Brooks' High Anxiety
In compiling the movie soundtrack for his Alfred Hitchcock par-
ody High Anxiety, Mel Brooks incorporated by allusion the most dis-
tinctive and cliched music associated with Hitchcock films (i.e., the
screeching, repetitive violin part from the infamous shower scene in
Psycho). While in general the taking of the most distinctive portion
of another's copyrighted musical work for use in one's own composi-
tion is the very definition of infringement, in the parody context such
musical allusions utilized to "conjure up" the original are by defini-
tion "fair use."
D. Sound Recording Splicing and Sampling
It is beyond the scope of this article to consider the many legal
ramifications of "digital sampling," a recording technique popular
in "rap" and other forms of popular music which enables a record
producer to electronically insert pieces of an original, pre-existing
sound recording (usually of a musical composition) into a new sound
recording with or without change or manipulation.10 4 Suffice it to
say that such sampling uses are subject to the same analysis applied
in all other copyright infringement cases in which the fair use issue
is raised.
Long before development of sampling technology, however, the
late parodist Dickie Goodman perfected a comedy genre consisting
of splicing very short portions of hit records (in nearly all cases, ten
seconds or less) into his parody recordings as answers to questions
posed in mock interviews with celebrities and politicians. For exam-
ple, in one of his records from 1974 Dees feigned asking President
Nixon about the Watergate scandal, to which the reply was a brief
excerpt of recording artist Helen Reddy singing the words "leave
me alone, won't you leave me alone" from her similarly titled hit.
According to Goodman's attorney, Monte Morris, every such use
of copyrighted sound recordings and underlying musical composi-
tions was painstakingly licensed in order to satisfy Goodman's rec-
104. See generally Gordon and Sanders, The Rap on Sampling, N.Y.L.J., 81
N.Y.L.J. 5 (1989), 86 N.Y.L.J. 5 (1989), 91 N.Y.L.J. 5 (1989), 96 N.Y.L.J. 5 (1989).
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ord company which feared exposure for copyright infringement.
There is a strong case to be made, however, that this genre of par-
ody falls within the fair use doctrine as it is presently construed.
Such splicing activities would fall on the fair use side of the
"near-verbation taking" threshold test, as only a few seconds of
sound and music are utilized from each pre-existing work. The only
foreseeable problem could come in satisfying the "nexus" threshold
inquiry.
Applying the law as it exists today, the Ninth Circuit ruled that in
the Dees case Dees' parody of "When Sunny Gets Blue" had suffi-
cient connection to the targets of the parody (drug abuse, love songs
and Johnny Mathis) to satisfy the nexus test, taking into account "the
song, its place and time." Applying these criteria to the Helen
Reddy/Richard Nixon parody described above, the parodist could
argue successfully that a sufficient nexus exists between contempo-
rary songs and current events since each could be viewed as a re-
flection of the other ("life imitating art," etc.).
Moreover, parodists have often relied upon current works to serve
as a vehicle for the lampooning of political, social or religious sub-
jects. It could also be argued that an inverse of the "expanded con-
jure-up" test announced in Elsmere and adopted in Dees, should
apply: that the smaller the taking, the less substantial the nexus be-
tween the pre-existing work utilized and the subject of the parody
may be.
Turning to a fair use analysis, the commercial nature of the Good-
man type parody would establish a Betamax presumptionl ° s of un-
fair use. This presumption, however, could likely be overcome by a
combination of the de minimis nature of the takings, the absence of
any threat of market usurpation to the works utilized, and the polit-
ical or "newsworthy" content of the parodies, if any.
In practice, of course, prior to release of a similar project today, a
practical balancing test weighing the expense and time consuming
nature of obtaining mechanical and master use licenses from the
owners of the sound recordings and musical compositions, against
the risks of litigation and the likelihood of success in the event of
such a suit, would be in order.
E. Musical Parody in Commercial Advertising
The final category of music parody to be considered is commer-
cial advertising. The longstanding practice by corporate advertis-
ers of licensing popular songs for the purpose of transforming them
into commercial jingles is still very prevalent in the 1990's. As the
"rock and roll generation" of baby boomers has grown into a siza-
105. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984). See
supra note 71, at 26 and note 80, at 29.
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ble segment of the American consumer market, Madison Avenue
has noted the particular receptiveness of this group to advertising
which incorporates popular songs from the eras of the late 1950's,
the '60's, and the '70's during which the baby boomers were grow-
ing up.
Parody in the commercial advertising context generally signifies a
change in the lyrics of a popular song to incorporate reference to
the product being advertised. A good example is the enormously
successful use by the California Raisin Growers Association of the
classic 1960's song "Heard It Through The Grapevine" in their tele-
vision ads. The lyrics of the original, "heard it through the grape-
vine, not much longer will you be mine," were changed for the
commercials to "heard it through the grapevine, in the California
sunshine." Likewise, the Sunkist company has utilized Beach Boy
Brian Wilson's 1960's milestone composition "Good Vibrations" to
advertise orange juice products, incorporating the new lyrics "I'm
picking up good vibrations, Sunkist is a taste sensation."
Many songwriters and composers will not permit the licensing of
their works for use in commercial advertisements, especially if par-
ody is involved. Some have such restrictions included in their
agreements with music publishers or copyright administrators,
although generally the publisher or administrator will abide by the
writer's wishes in this regard even if there is no contractual prohibi-
tion against commercial advertising uses. 106
According to several music publisher sources, there is a basic ac-
ceptance by advertisers that the parodying of a song in a commer-
cial advertisement will increase the licensing fee over the amount
that would be charged for a "straight" use in the same commercial.
The reason for this is a perception that commercial parody increases
the risk of damaging the integrity, popularity, and future marketabil-
ity of the musical work.
It should be noted that in order to utilize a musical work in any
commercial advertising context for broadcast or display in any man-
ner, the advertiser or broadcaster must procure a "commercial use"
license from the music copyright owner. The performing rights li-
censed to broadcasters by the American societies ASCAP, BMI, and
SESAC do not extend to the licensee the right to prepare "deriva-
tive works" (such as advertisements) which incorporate the licensed
musical works. 10 7
Moreover, as it is clear from the Tin Pan Apple and Crazy Eddie
cases, unlicensed parody of a copyrighted work in a commercial
advertising context will rarely if ever be construed as fair use.
106. Radio Week Magazine 7 (October 3, 1988).
107. S. Shemel & W. Krasilovsky, Tmis Busunss OF Music 310 (rev. ed., 1977).
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SUMMATION
Since the beginning of the 20th Century, musical parody has
evolved into a very popular component of American culture. The
courts have responded by carving out distinct parameters within
which musical parodists may safely operate, outside the reach of
music copyright owners. The rights of those same copyright owners,
however, are also well delineated, providing them with protection
against the unreasonable taking of their musical works.
In a free society, that is the balance which must be struck: the
parodist and the creator of the parodied work must be afforded pro-
tections in order to foster their mutually important and continued
contribution to public discourse and national culture.***
*** Research assistance by Randy S. Frisch, a third-year student at Boston Uni-
versity School of Law, and a Notes Editor of the American Journal of Law and
Medicine.
